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Abstract
This paper identies shocks to the Federal Reserves ination target as VAR innovations
that make the largest contribution to future movements in long-horizon ination expectations.
The e¤ectiveness of this scheme is documented via Monte-Carlo experiments. The estimated
impulse responses indicate that a positive shock to the target is associated with a large increase
in ination, GDP growth and long-term interest rates. Target shocks are estimated to be a vital
factor behind the increase in ination during the pre-1980 period and are an important driver
of the decline in long-term interest rates over the last two decades.
Key words: SVAR, DSGE model, ination target.
JEL codes: C5, E1, E5, E6
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, nominal interest rates in the US have remained persistently
close to the zero lower bound (ZLB). This unique situation has highlighted the potential limitations
of conventional monetary policy. While many central banks have pursued unconventional mone-
tary policies such as quantitative easing, their e¤ectiveness in stimulating the real economy is not
undisputed (see Gambacorta et al. (2014)). In this scenario, the role of the Federal Reserves (Fed)
implicit ination target has returned to the forefront. Some commentators have argued that a tar-
get higher than 2 percent should be considered in order to mitigate the negative e¤ects of the ZLB
on the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy (see Ball (2014)). Potential changes in the Feds implicit
target are also of interest from a historical perspective. In a seminal paper, Ireland (2007) shows
that this target level varied substantially and was one of the main factor behind the great ination
of the 1970s. Gürkaynak et al. (2005) show that adding a time-varying ination target is crucial in
trying to understand the response of forward interest rates to macroeconomic developments.
In this paper, we propose a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) that can be used to identify
shocks to the ination target. The identication scheme exploits the idea that innovations to the
ination target are the main driver of long-horizon ination expectations in the medium to the
Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of
England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views





long-run. In other words, we apply the identication of Uhlig (2004a) to estimate the ination
target shock as the VAR innovation that makes the largest contribution to the forecast error
variance (FEV) of a measure of long-horizon ination expectations. Using an extensive Monte-
Carlo experiment, we show that this simple strategy can successfully recover the ination target
shock and its impact on macroeconomic and nancial variables.
Estimates of this SVAR using US data indicate that an ination target shock that raises long-
horizon ination expectations by 1 percent has a large impact on the economy. In our benchmark
model, this shock is associated with an impact on CPI ination of about 1:2 percent, one year ahead,
and a peak increase in short and long-term interest rates of about 3 percent. Real GDP growth is
estimated to increase by about 0:8 percent in response to this shock after one year, albeit, with the
estimated response displaying less persistence than the interest rate and ination responses. The
contribution of this shock to the FEV of GDP growth and ination is 30 percent and 55 percent,
respectively, at the 5 year horizon. The shock is especially important for long-term interest rates
with a contribution to FEV of over 70 percent at this horizon. A historical decomposition indicates
that in the absence of ination target shocks, the 1970s would have seen low interest rates and
ination and the persistent decline of long term interest rates witnessed since the 1990s would have
been substantially smaller.
The role of the Feds ination target has been considered in a number of recent studies. Kozicki
and Tinsley (2005) present a generalised VAR model that includes a law of motion for the ination
target set by the monetary authority and the target perceived by the private sector, both of which
are assumed to be unobserved by the econometrician. The estimates of these quantities suggest
substantial time-variation with the target declining in the post-1980 period. Similar results are
reported by papers such as Ireland (2007) and De Graeve et al. (2009). This strand of the literature
pursues a more structural approach and incorporates time-varying ination targets into DSGE and
Macro-nance DSGE models, respectively.
Relative to this literature, the approach developed in the current paper is more data-driven.
This o¤ers two potential advantages. The rst is simplicity and applicability our SVAR model
can be readily applied to economies that have a range of features. In contrast, approaches based
on DSGE model and state-space models require additional assumptions that need to tailored to
the economy in question. Second, our VAR based approach is likely to provide a better t to the
data when compared to models that impose a larger degree of cross-equation restrictions and thus
provides an empirical benchmark.
The analysis in the paper has important policy implications. The results, again, highlight the
important part played by the Feds target in shaping the temporal evolution of ination and long-
term interest rates. The estimated dynamic responses to target shocks suggest that this aspect of
the Feds policy can be an e¤ective tool in stimulating the economy and raising the level of ination.
This latter result is of potential interest to monetary authorities in several OECD countries that
have faced persistently low ination over the recent past.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the SVAR used in this study and provides
a description of the Monte-Carlo experiment used to test the methods performance. Empirical
results are presented in section 3 while section 4 concludes.
2 Identifying shocks to the ination target
Our empirical strategy is based on the following simple idea. From a theoretical point of view,





and range of additional disturbances (~"t) which include technology shocks and policy and
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However, over the medium to long-run horizons the role of "

t dominates in relative terms. While
~"t can a¤ect long-horizon ination expectations, uctuations in LH in the medium to long-run are
largely driven by shocks to the ination target. In other words, if on average across the sample, the
monetary authority reacts systematically to changes in ination and is, at least, perceived to be
credible in the long-run, then long-horizon ination expectations would coincide with the ination
target. As a consequence, any further changes in long-horizon ination expectations reect shocks
to the ination target.





where the endogenous variables Yt include a measure of long-horizon ination expectations ^LH
and a set of macroeconomic and nancial variables Xt, and we order ^LH rst for simplicity. The
orthogonal shocks are denoted by "t and A0 represents the contemporaneous impact matrix such
that A0A00 = : It is well known that A0 is not unique but the space spanned by these matrices
can be written as ~A0Q where Q is an orthonormal rotation matrix such that Q0Q = I
The shock to the ination target is then identied by imposing the restriction that this shock
makes the largest contribution the forecast error variance (FEV) of ^LH . Consider the VAR in
structural moving average form:
Yt = B (L)A0"t
The k period ahead forecast error of the ith variable is given by:





where e1 is a selection vector that picks out ^LH in the set of variables. Following Uhlig (2004a), the
















such that Q01Q1 = 1. Here Q1 is the column of Q that corresponds to the shock that explains the
largest proportion of the FEV of the rst variable in the VAR, ^LH . As shown by Uhlig (2004b),
the maximisation can be re-written as eigenvalue eigenvector problem and a solution can be readily
obtained.
The proposed identication di¤ers from the method used in Michelis and Iacoviello (2016)
to identify target shocks. These authors impose exact long-run restrictions on the behaviour of
ination and interest rates. In contrast, our approach is more agnostic and focuses on the medium
run dynamics of variables rather than their behaviour in the innite future which may be hard to
pin down with a limited sample (see Erceg et al. (2005)). In a recent contribution, Arias et al.
(2016) uses a mix of sign and zero restrictions to identify the systematic component of monetary
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policy as embodied in the contemporaneous coe¢ cients in a policy rule. In contrast, our approach
focuses on the implicit ination target and imposes no explicit restrictions on the interest rate
equation in the SVAR model.
In order to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of this identication scheme we consider an extensive
Monte-Carlo experiment. As described in detail below, we use a DSGE model that allows for a
time-varying ination target as our data generating process (DGP). The aim is to check if the
proposed identication scheme is able to recover the ination target shock and provide a reliable
estimate of its transmission.
2.1 DSGE Model
We use a DSGE model based on De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016). The technical appendix
contains a detailed description of the model equations. Here we describe the key features of the
model economy. In this economy, households consume, supply labour and accumulate capital 
subject to an investment adjustment cost. Households have monopoly power over their wages. A
fraction of them receive a random signal to set their wage optimally, with the remaining agents
set wages based on a backward looking indexation rule. Households decide optimally about the
degree of the capital utilisation, which is again subject to a cost, that determines the level of capital
services. Intermediate good producers hire labour and capital services from households in order to
produce. They have a monopoly over the price they charge, with price-setting subject to the same
friction as wages. All the model features discussed so far are common with those in the literature
(Smets and Wouters (2007), Christiano et al. (2005), Justiniano et al. (2010)).




and long-term government debt 
bLt

. Following Woodford (2001) the latter asset is modelled as perpetuities that cost pL;t at time
t and pay an exponentially decaying coupon s at time t + s + 1 where 0 <   1. As explained
in Woodford (2001) and Chen et al. (2012), the advantage of this formulation is that the price in
period t of a bond issued s periods ago pL s;t is a function of the current price pL;t
pL s;t = spL;t (3)
This relation allows us to express the balance sheet equation and government budget constraint in
a simple form (see the discussion in Chen et al. (2012)). Furthermore, in order to keep the analysis
simple and tractable, we rule out the possibility of a secondary market for long-term bonds, implying
that agents who buy long-term debt must hold it until maturity. In addition, long-term debt is a
modelled as a less liquid asset than short-term debt. This is achieved by making the prot function
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is the liquidity friction and its size is captured by the parameter
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x. Finally, the parameter # indicates the degree of liquidity smoothing. Our set-up gives rise to
an endogenous term-premium and this drives a wedge between expectations about the policy rate
and the long-term interest rate.
The Governments budget constraint is given by
bSt +









where the left hand side is the total (short plus long-term) debt issued by the government at time t




















The ination target shock evolves according to
t   0:999t 1 =  (t 1   0:999t 2) + !;t (7)
2.1.1 Perceived versus Actual Ination Target Shocks
Agents in the model discussed above observe both the ination target and monetary policy shocks.
Following Erceg and Levin (2003), Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) we
also consider a version of the model where this assumption is relaxed. In this version, agents do not
observe the source of departure of the (log linearly approximated) policy rate from its rule, namely






o^t = [1  (1  R)] ^t   R ^t 1 + m^t (9)
In other words agents in the economy observe o^t but not its individual components, however, they









by solving a Kalman Filter extraction problem. In this economy it is the Kalman Filter estimate




that enters in the price and wage Phillips curve equations and
not the actual ination target process which is assumed to be unobserved.
2.1.2 Active versus Passive Monetary Policy
The benchmark model does not incorporate the possibility that over some periods, monetary policy
may have been passive with  < 1. Under these circumstances, ination expectations are de-
anchored and respond persistently to structural shocks. In order to take this into account, we
consider a Markov switching version of the benchmark model that allows for regime switches in the
policy rule between an active ( > 1) and passive ( < 1) state:




















2.2 Monte Carlo Simulations
The benchmark model is estimated using Bayesian likelihood techniques discussed in An and
Schorfheide (2007)1 We use the data set of Smets and Wouters (2007) with the sample truncated at
2007Q4 to avoid issues with the zero lower bound. Information about the prior and the posterior
distribution of the structural parameter vector can be found in the technical Appendix. Briey,
the prior moments of the structural parameters coincide with those in Smets and Wouters (2007)
study, while the posterior ones are very similar to those in the existing literature.
The Monte-Carlo experiment is based on 1000 simulated data sets of 200 observations.2At each
replication we simulate series for output, ination, the short-term and the long-term interest rate
and 10 year ahead ination expectations. This set of endogenous variables is used to estimate a
V AR (P ) model where the lag length is determined via the Schwarz criterion. The identication
scheme discussed above is applied to identify the target shock and the resulting impulse responses
are stored.
Figure 1 shows the results from the experiment when the structural parameter vector for the
benchmark DGP is set equal to the estimated posterior mode. The black line and the shaded
area correspond to the point wise 50, 5 and 95 percentiles of the simulated distribution using
the proposed identication scheme. The blue circle line represents the underlying response to the
ination target shock in the DSGE model. The gure suggests that the VAR estimates of the
response to this shock provide a close approximation of true responses in the DGP.
Next, we check if the performance of the identication scheme is robust to di¤erent DSGE
parameter values. To this end, we draw 1000 parameter vectors from the estimated DSGE posterior
distribution and use them to simulate the 1000 data sets for the experiment.
Figure 2 illustrates again that the success of the VAR identication scheme does not depend on
a particular DSGE parameter vector.
Next, we investigate whether the econometrician can identify the ination target shock suc-
cessfully when the agents in the economy cannot observe them. We repeat the simulation steps
mentioned in the rst experiment but we use the model where ination target and monetary policy
shocks unobserved. Figure 3 suggests that even in this case the identication scheme performs
remarkably well. This is because agents learn about the true shock and the inference error does
not survive long enough to have an e¤ect on the long-horizon ination expectations.
Our nal exercise examines the ability of the scheme to recover the true shocks when monetary
authorities preferences towards ination switch stochastically between dovish and hawkish
regimes. This simulation is carried out by setting all parameter values except  to the posterior
mode of the benchmark model. We assume that in the hawkish regime,  (st = 1) = 1:83, while in
the dovish regime this parameter is set less than one ( (st = 2) = 0:83). The estimates of Bianchi
and Melosi (2016) are used to calibrate the transition probabilities at p11 = 0:95 and p22 = 0:7 and
the model is solved using the RISE toolbox ( see (Maih, 2015)). As before, we simulate data form
this model and estimate the SVAR and the response to target shocks.
Figure 4 suggests that the VAR identication continues to perform remarkably well even in
this environment. This is because when the sample is considered as a whole, the impact of dovish
1The estimation and simulations are implemented using Dynare 4.4.3. All the les can be downloaded from
authorspersonal web page.
2Actually 10200 observations are simulated each time and the rst 10000 pseudo data points are dropped to
eliminate the e¤ects caused by the initial conditions.
6
Figure 1: Using posterior mode estimates. The black line and the shadow pink area correspond to
the pointwise 50, 5 and 95 percentiles of the simulated distribution. The blue circle line represents
the DSGE true response to an ination target shock.
Figure 2: Using draws from the estimated DSGE posterior. See notes to gure 1.
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Figure 3: Using the version of the model with unobserved target and policy shock. See notes to
gure 1.
Figure 4: Using the version of the model with regime switching. The DSGE response is an average
across the two regimes. See notes to gure 1.
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regimes is mitigated by the presence of regimes during which the monetary authority responds
actively to ination. As a consequence, ination target shocks continue to exert a major inuence
on long-horizon ination expectations in this economy.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and model specication
Implementation of the SVAR model described above requires a series for long-horizon ination
expectations. The existing literature typically uses either survey based measures or those derived
from nancial market prices. For our purpose, an important concern relates to the span of the data
available. In other words, it may be the case that shocks to the ination target are not observed
regularly and therefore the proposed identication strategy is more e¤ective in a reasonably long
sample. With this in mind, our benchmark proxy for LH is a spliced survey based measure of long
horizon PCE ination expectations used in the Federal Reserve board model. This measure (with
mnemonic PTR) is available on a quarterly basis from 1968Q1 to 2016Q3. In the earlier part of the
sample PTR uses estimates of ination expectations from Kozicki and Tinsley (2001). Data for the
1980s is obtained from the discontinued Decision Makers poll (DMP). Published by Richard Hoey,
this survey aimed to capture the 5 to 10 year ahead expectations of participants in the nancial
markets. From 1991Q4 onwards, the series is based on 1 to 10 year ahead ination expectations
taken from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
We check the robustness of the results by using an alternative measure based on blue chip
economic indicators and the Livingstone survey. 10 year ahead expectations regarding CPI ination
are available from the latter survey since 1991 and are published in June and December of each year.
This survey represents the views of academic and non-academic economists. Prior to 1991, this
series is based on long horizon forecasts of CPI ination included in blue chip economic indicators.
These forecasts are published in March and October and are available from October 1979.3As this
data is bi-annual, we use a mixed frequency version of the VAR model (see Schorfheide and Song
(2015)) described below. As this series is available at a lower frequency and for a smaller period,
PTR remains our preferred proxy for LH .




t jYt j + vt (11)
where  is a vector of intercepts, Yt includes ^LH , real GDP growth (yt), CPI ination (t), the
10 year government bond yield (It) and the three month treasury bill rate (Rt). The data for the
10 year yield is obtained from Global Financial data. All remaining variables are taken from the
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis FRED database. Appendix A describes the data sources in
detail. When the blue chip and Livingstone series is used for ^LH , the model is augmented by an
observation equation that implements the assumption that the observed expectations data is an
average of missing observations in the previous and current quarter. These missing observations
are treated as latent variables with the transition equation given by 11 in companion form.
3From 1979 to 1983, the blue chip forecasts are for the GNP deator. A combined series is made available by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Figure 5: The Federal Reserves ination target and actual ination.
The lag length P for the benchmark model is set to 2.4 We adopt a Bayesian approach to model
estimation and use a Gibbs sampling algorithm to approximate the posterior distribution of the
parameters. As described in the technical appendix, we use a natural conjugate prior with tightness
set to values commonly used in the literature for US data. As discussed below, the results are not
sensitive to the tightness of the prior. The appendix provides details of the conditional posterior
distributions and the steps of the Gibbs sampler. We also provide a description of the extended
algorithm used to estimate the mixed frequency VAR model when the ination expectations based
on the blue chip and Livingstone surveys is employed in the estimation.
As discussed above, the shock to the implicit ination target is identied via the restriction
that this shock makes the largest contribution to the FEV of ^LH at horizon K. The benchmark
model uses K = 40, but the results are robust to using a longer horizon.
3.2 Empirical Results
Figure 5 presents the ination target implied by the historical decomposition from the benchmark
SVAR model that uses PTR as the measure of long-horizon ination expectations. This is calcu-
lated as the portion of (annual) ination driven by the identied ination target shocks, with the
remaining innovations set to zero. The estimates of the target level show a number of similarities to
estimates of this object presented in Kozicki and Tinsley (2005), Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011)
4Both the Schwarz criterion and a marginal likelihood comparison suggests a lag length of 1. We employ an extra
lag to capture any remaining dynamics. The results are robust to using P = 1 or P = 4:
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and Ireland (2007). In particular, the mid and the late 1970s saw the target rise substantially with
peaks of 8 to 10 percent. The rise in the estimated target in these periods lagged the increase in
actual ination suggesting that the Fed was accommodating the impact of inationary shocks (see
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005)). After the appointment of Paul Volcker to the chairmanship of the
Fed in 1979Q4, both target and actual ination declined. After the mid-1980s, the target level has
hovered close to the 2 percent mark.
3.2.1 Impulse responses
11




, real GDP growth (yt), CPI ination
(t), the 10 year goverment bond yield (It), the three month treasury bill rate (Rt) and the real interest rate where at =
P3
i=0 t i. The
solid lines are posterior medians while the shaded area is the 68% error band.
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growth (yt), CPI ination (t), the 10 year goverment bond yield (It), the three month treasury bill rate (Rt) and the real interest rate
where at =
P3
i=0 t i. The solid lines are posterior medians while the shaded area is the 68% error band.
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Figure 6 presents the impulse responses to ination target shocks. The gure presents the
response to a shock that raises ^LH by 1 percent on impact. The impact e¤ect on GDP growth
and ination is estimated to be large but dissipates quickly. At the one year horizon the response
of GDP growth is 0:8 percent, while ination rises by 1:2 percent, with the response estimated
to be persistent. The last panel in the gure shows that the implied increase in annual ination
at is larger compared to the rise in the short-rate over the rst three years of the horizon. As
a consequence, the ex-post real interest rate declines substantially, before increasing by about 1:5
percent over the second half of the horizon. While the response of the long rate It is more sluggish
than that of the short-rate, the magnitude of the two responses is very similar at long horizons.
In order to check the robustness of these results to the measure of long-horizon ination expec-
tations, we re-estimate the VAR model using the series based on the blue chip forecasts and the
Livingstone survey. As discussed above, this VAR model entails the estimation of missing ination
expectations data, as well as the VAR parameters. Note also that the estimation sample excludes
the 1970s due to data unavailability. The impulse responses from this alternative model are shown
in gure 7. The response of GDP growth and ination to this shock is highly persistent and the
null hypothesis of a zero response can be rejected over most of the sample period. The magnitude
of the two responses, however, is estimated to be smaller than the benchmark model. As in the
benchmark model, the real rate declines, with the response reversing after one year. Both the
short and the long-term interest rate responses are large and persistent, albeit the peak response is
estimated to be smaller than the benchmark case. In summary, the estimated responses from this
model are qualitatively similar to the benchmark case. The estimated magnitude is smaller than
benchmark. This may reect the fact that the mixed frequency VAR treats some of the observations
on ^LH as unobserved and thus contains less information than the benchmark model for the task of
identifying the ination target shock. An alternative explanation can be based on the fact that the
post-1980 sample is dominated by the Great Moderation and a decline in the impact of structural
shocks over this period is well documented in the literature (see for example Galí and Gambetti
(2009)). The latter explanation would suggest that these estimates may represent the lower end of
the range of the impact of this shock. Nevertheless, the e¤ects of the ination target shock are still
estimated to be sizeable and are clearly di¤erent from zero from a statistical perspective.
The results of the benchmark model are robust to other changes in model specication. Details
of these additional robustness checks are given in the on-line technical appendix. First, we expand
the benchmark VAR model by adding the rst three principal components extracted from a large
panel of macroeconomic and nancial data for the US (FRED-QD database provided by the St.
Louis Fed). This allows us to incorporate a large amount of information into the model and
to account for potential information insu¢ ciency (see Forni and Gambetti (2014)). The impulse
responses from this model are shown in Figure 2 of the technical appendix. The results are very
close to the benchmark estimates indicating robustness with respect to this issue. Similarly, when
the benchmark model is estimated on pre-2007 data, the results are largely una¤ected (see Figure
3 in the technical appendix). As mentioned above, using a lag length of 1 or 4 does not alter the
key conclusions (See Figures 4 and Figure 5 in the technical appendix). Figure 6 in the technical
appendix shows that if the FEV restrictions are imposed using a horizon of 80 quarters, the key
results survive. Finally, Figure 7 shows that the use of a at prior leads to conclusions that are
similar to the benchmark case.
While the Monte-Carlo experiment in section 2.1 provides strong evidence on the e¤ective-
ness of the proposed identication scheme, it is interesting to further scrutinise the properties of
the identied shock. For this purpose, we follow Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017) and consider the
cross-correlation between the estimated target shock and shocks identied in the literature to be
important for business cycle uctuations. As shown in Figure 8, we consider monetary policy
14
Figure 8: Correlation between the target shock and other structural shocks. The sold line is the
median correlation, while the error band represents the 95 percent condence interval obtained via
bootstrap.
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shocks identied by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and scal shocks taken from Ramey (2011) and
Romer and Romer (2010). Policy uncertainty (EPU) shocks are proxied as residuals to an AR(4)
model using the economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2017). TFP news shocks are
taken from Barsky and Sims (2011) while we use the measure of oil shocks constructed by Ramey
and Vine (2011). Figure 8 shows that the estimated correlations are insignicant at most lags or
leads. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated correlations is small in all cases. This provides
evidence that the shock identied in our SVAR model is distinct from other policy and non-policy
disturbances.
In summary, the benchmark results and the sensitivity analysis suggests the following conclu-
sion: a unit ination target shock is estimated to have an impact on US GDP growth, CPI ination,
the short and long term interest rate that is sizeable from an economic and statistical perspective.
We now turn to evaluating the contribution of ination target shocks.
3.2.2 Variance and historical decomposition
16




, real GDP growth (yt),
CPI ination (t), the 10 year goverment bond yield (It), the three month treasury bill rate (Rt). The solid lines are posterior medians
while the shaded area is the 68% error band.
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Figure 10: Contribution of shocks other than ination target shocks to the de-trended data. The contributions are shown for PTR 
^LH

, real GDP growth (yt), CPI ination (t), the 10 year goverment bond yield (It), the three month treasury bill rate (Rt). The
solid lines are posterior medians while the shaded area is the 68% error band. The shaded vertical bands show NBER recession dates.
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Figure 9 shows the contribution of the ination target shock to the forecast error variance (FEV)
estimated using the benchmark model. By construction, the shock explains the bulk of the FEV of
^LH . At the two year horizon, the shock contributes about 23% to the FEV of GDP growth. The
contribution to FEV of CPI ination at this horizon is estimated to be about 48%. It is interesting
to note that these contributions are larger than those typically reported for the monetary policy
shock (see for example Bernanke et al. (2005)). The bottom panels of the gure show that this
shock makes the most important contribution to the FEV of It and Rt explaining the bulk of the
FEV at long horizons.
A similar conclusion is reached when examining the contribution of this shock to the historical
uctuations in these interest rates. Figure 10 plots (de-trended) data for the endogenous variables
along with the counter-factual estimates from the VAR assuming that the ination target shock
equals zero at each point in time. The second row of the gure shows that after the early 1990s the
counter-factual estimate of the interest rates is above the observed data, implying that uctuations
in the implicit target of the Fed helped to keep these rates at depressed levels over the last two
decades. The ination target shock made a strong positive contribution to ination during the mid
and late-1970s. The great ination is largely absent in the counter-factual scenario and the impact
of inationary shocks in the early and the late 1970s is muted. The counter-factual estimate of
ination largely remains above the actual data after the mid-1980s providing some support for the
hypothesis that systematic policy contributed to low ination seen over the Great Moderation. It
is interesting to note that in the absence of these shocks, GDP growth is estimated to have been
higher over the last two decades.
Decomposition results based on the VAR that uses the blue chipnLivingstone ination expecta-
tion series suggests similar conclusions. The ination target shock is estimated to explain about 50
percent of the FEV of the short and long term interest rate. As in the benchmark case, the shock
makes a modest contribution to GDP growth. We estimate that the contribution to the ination
FEV is about 20 percent at the two year horizon. While still sizeable, this estimate is smaller than
the benchmark case. As discussed above, this may reect the decline in the impact of shocks over
the Great Moderation period or the fact that the blue chipnLivingstone data is available at a lower
frequency and for a smaller time span.5
4 Conclusions
We propose to identify shocks to the Feds implicit ination target as innovations in an SVAR that
explain the bulk of the FEV of long-horizon ination expectations. When this scheme is applied
to data simulated from a DSGE model that features a time-varying ination target, we are able to
recover the target shock and estimate its transmission with precision. This result remains robust
when the target is assumed to be unobserved by the agents in the model.
Application of this SVAR to US data suggests that the impact of a 1 percent positive ination
target shock is large with the peak e¤ect on GDP growth and ination, one year ahead, estimated
to be 0:8 percent and 1:2 percent, respectively. The shock has its largest impact on both the short
and the long-term interest rate. Decompositions from the SVAR indicate that this shock was the
major driving force behind the great ination of the 1970s and contributed substantially to the
persistent decline observed in long-term interest rates.
In future work, it would be interesting to investigate the transmission of this shock in other
OECD countries. It may also be useful to estimate the spillover e¤ects of US ination target shocks
to ination rates and long term yields in industrialised countries and emerging markets.
5These additional results are presented in the technical appendix.
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A Appendix A: Data sources
FRED is Federal Reserve Economic data (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) and GFD refers to
Global Financial Data (http://www.globalnancialdata.com/).
Data on ination expectations
 PTR. Downloaded from FRB/US model webpage.
 Blue Chip/Livingstone survey. Available from the Philadelphia Fed.
Macroeconomic/Financial data for the United States
 Real GDP: Real GDP (FRED series id GDPC96).
 CPI (FRED series id CPIAUCSL). We calculate ination as the quarterly growth in CPI.
 3 month Treasury Bill rate (FRED series id TB3MS).
 10 Year government bond yield (GFD code IGUSA10D)
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The Federal Reserves implicit ination target and Macroeconomic









JEL codes: C5, E1, E5, E6
1 Estimation of the Bayesian VAR model
Consider the reduced form VAR
Yt =  t +
PX
j=1
t jYt j + vt; var (vt) = 

where  t is 1 M vector of exogenous regressors, which in our application includes an intercept.
We adopt a Bayesian approach to estimation of the reduced form VAR model. We introduce a
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where 1 to N denotes the prior mean for the coe¢ cients on the rst lag,  is the tightness of
the prior on the VAR coe¢ cients and c is the tightness of the prior on the constant terms. In
our application, the prior means are chosen as the OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients of an AR(1)
regression estimated for each endogenous variable using a training sample. We set  = 0:1: The
scaling factors i are set using the standard deviation of the error terms from these preliminary
Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of
England or to state Bank of England policy. This paper should therefore not be reported as representing the views





AR(1) regressions. Finally we set c = 1=1000 in our implementation indicating a at prior on the












where i denotes the sample means of the endogenous variables calculated using the training sample.
As in Banbura et al. (2010), the tightness of this sum of coe¢ cients prior is set as  = 10 .












 jB )  IW (S; T ): (4)
where X denotes the right hand side variables  t; Yt 1; ::Yt P : The posterior means are given by
B=(X0X) 1 (X0Y ) and S=(Y  X) ~B0(Y  X ~B) , where Y =[Y ;YD;1;YD;2],X=[X;XD;1;XD;2]
and ~B is the draw of the VAR coe¢ cients B reshaped to be conformable with X. T  denotes
the number of rows of Y . A Gibbs sampler o¤ers a convenient method to simulate the posterior
distribution of B and 
 by drawing successively from these conditional posteriors. We employ
25,000 iterations using the last 5000 for inference.
Once the iterations are past the burn-in stage, we calculate the contemporaneous impact matrix.
As described in the main text, the the VAR in structural moving average form is:
Yt = B (L)A0"t
The k period ahead forecast error of the ith variable is given by:





where e1 is a selection vector that picks out ^LH in the set of variables. Following Uhlig (2004a), the
















such that Q01Q1 = 1. Here Q1 is the column of Q that corresponds to the shock that explains the













~A0. The maximisation problem can be expressed as a La-
grangian




The rst order condition is SQ1 = Q1. As shown by Uhlig (2004b), this is an eigenvalue-
eigenvector problem. The column Q1 that maximises the variance is the eigenvector associated
2
with the largest eigenvalue : We use the matlab code written by Kurmann and Otrok (2013) to
implement this solution.
2 Estimation of the Bayesian Mixed Frequency VAR model
The observation equation of the model is dened as





where zt denotes the remaining N   1 endogenous variables in the VAR.
As discussed in the text, the Blue ChipnLivingstone survey proxy for ^LH is unavailable every
quarter. t denotes the ns 1 vector of state variables
 




where ~LHt denotes the
unknown higher frequency data on ination expectations. At time t, if ^LHt is missing, the matrix






and var (Vt) = 1e10:
At time t, if ^LHt is available and ^
LH
t 1 is missing, we assume that ^
LH
t is an average of the









and var (Vt) = 0.
For some periods both ^LHt and ^
LH
t 1 are available. Then we assume that for that period






and var (Vt) = 0.
The transition equation is a V AR(2) written in companion form
t = + Ft 1 + et
where var (et) = 
:
As in the standard VAR model, we assume a natural conjugate prior for the VAR parameters.
Given t, the conditional posterior of the VAR coe¢ cients ; F and the error covariance 
 is as
dened for the BVAR above and these parameters can be easily draw. Conditional on a draw for
 = ; F;













where ~T = [1; 2; ::T ] ; ~zT = [z1; z2; ::zT ]. The mean and variance of the normal density
H (T n~zT ) can be obtained via the Kalman lter. Carter and Kohn (1994) provide the updat-





25000 iterations of the Gibbs Sampler and retain the last 5000 iterations for inference.
3
Figure 1: Estimated quarterly data for long-horizon blue chipnLivingstone survey ination expec-
tations.
Figure 1 presents the estimated posterior distribution of ~LHt and compares it with the observed
low frequency data.
3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we present a number of robustness checks regarding the benchmark VAR model.
First, we expand the benchmark VAR model by adding the rst three principal components ex-
tracted from a large panel of macroeconomic and nancial data for the US (FRED-QD database
provided by the St Louis Fed). This allows us to incorporate large amount information into the
model and to potentially account for potential information insu¢ ciency (see Forni and Gambetti
(2014)). The impulse responses and FEV decomposition from this model are very similar to the
benchmark case (see gure 2). When the model is estimated truncated the sample to 2007, the
main conclusions are largely una¤ected (see gure 3). Figures 4 and 5 show that altering the lag
length to 1 and 4 respectively does not a¤ect the benchmark results greatly. Figure 6 shows that
the results are similar to benchmark when a horizon of 80 quarters is used for shock identication.
Figure 7 shows that the results are not materially di¤erent if a at prior for the VAR parameters
is used. Figure 8 shows the variance decomposition using the mixed frequency VAR model.
4
Figure 2: Response from a version of the benchmark model that includes principal components from a large data set.
5
Figure 3: Response from a version of the benchmark model estimated using data up to 2006Q4.
6
Figure 4: Response from a version of the benchmark model estimated using a lag length of 1.
7
Figure 5: Response from a version of the benchmark model estimated using a lag length of 4.
8
Figure 6: Response from a version of the benchmark model estimated using a horizon of 80 quarters to identify the target shock.
9
Figure 7: Response from a version of the benchmark model estimated using a at prior.
10




Three types of rms are operated in the domestic economy. The intermediate monopolistically
competitive domestic rms use labour supplied by households to produce a di¤erentiated good that
is sold to a nal good producer who employs a continuum of these di¤erentiated goods in her con-
stant elasticity of substitution CES production to deliver the nal good. The monopolistically
competitive importing rms use a costless technology and turn a homogenous good bought in
the world market into a di¤erentiated good, which is then sold to the domestic consumers. The
exporting monopolistically competitive rms use similar brand namingtechnology and transform
the domestic nal good into a di¤erentiated product that is sold to foreign households.
This sector consists of three rms, the labour packerwho hires labour from households and
transforms it into a homogenous input good  hdt , a continuum of monopolistically competitive
rms that buys hdt and produces an intermediate yi;t and the nal good producer who combines all
these intermediate products into a single good consumed by households. The nal good producers















y + yy;t 1 + y!y ;t (6)
denotes the time-varying mark-up in the domestic good market. The nal good producers demand
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is a stationary exogenous technological process and hdi;t is the amount of homogeneous labour rented
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The real marginal cost for the intermediate rms is given by the rst order conditions of (12) with














 of intermediate rms receive a random signal and they are allowed to
optimally reset their prices pnewi;t . The proportion  y of rms that cannot reoptimise prices








pt 1 is the gross ination and y is the indexation parameter. The pricing problem of









































































































































The domestic economy is populated by a continuum of households that attain utility from con-
















where dt is a discount factor shock
dt = (1  d) d+ ddt 1 + d!d (24)
 is the discount factor, ' the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, c the inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and b the habit formation parameter. They also invest on scal capital
that is rented to rms, furthermore capiltal accumulation is subject to investment adjustment cost











Households real budget constraint is given by
Dh;t + c;t + i;t + ;t =
rht 1
t
Dh;t 1 + w;th;t + r
k
t ;t
k;t 1   u (;t) k;t 1 + F;t   T;t (26)
The household  uses its labour income w;th;t, net return on capital services rkt ;tk;t 1  




Tt and prots Ft to nance consumption, investment and new purchases of nancial assets
c;t + i;t +D;t + ;t . The household maximises (23) with respect to c;t, i;t, k;t 1 and Dh;t
subject to (26) and (25)
dt
(c;t   bc;t 1)c   Et
bdt+1


















































The nancial intermediary rm issues deposits to households paying a gross interest rate rht . The
rm then purchases a portfolio of short and long term government issued bonds paying interest rSt
and rLt .
Similar to Andres et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2012), Harrison (2012) and Liu et al. (2014) we
follow the formulation in Woodford (2001) and long-term bonds are perpetuities that cost pL;t at
time t and pay an exponentially decaying coupon s at time t + s + 1 where 0 <   1. As it is
explained in Woodford (2001) and Chen et al. (2012) the advantage of this formulation is that the
price in period t of a bond issued s periods ago pL s;t is a function of the coupon the current price
pL;t
pL s;t = spL;t (32)
This relation allows to express the balance sheet equation and government budget constraint (be-
low) in a familiar form that it is easy to work with it (see the discussion in Chen et al. (2012)).
Furthermore, in order to keep things simple, we rule out the possibility of a secondary market
for long-term bonds, meaning that agents who buy long-term debt must hold it until maturity.1
Finally, for simplicity we assume that all government bonds issued are purchased by this rm.

























Motivated by the work of Smets and Wouters (2007) we assume the balance sheet equation is

















































Intermediarys prots are subject to two adjustment costs. The st one captures the idea that
altering the foreign debt held by domestic intermediaries to GDP ratio is costly.2 The second term
reects the situation where although intermediaries prefer to hold more long than short-term debt
that decreases liquidity.
1See the discussion in Andres et al. (2004) for the advantages of that assumption.
2 In our model this term is not required to make the net foreign asset position of the model stationary (see the
discussion in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)) as we properly model long-term debt in the foreign economy.
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Prot maximisation with respect to short, domestic and foreign long-term debt and subject to
the balance sheet condition delivers an expression for the e¤ective rate faced by the household,
















= rSt   x
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  x B;t   #Bt 1   (1  #) B  tbS;t bL;t2 (37)
4.4 Wages
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume that each monopolistically competitive household supplies
a di¤erentiated labour service to the production section. They set their nominal wage and supply
any amount of labour demanded by the rms at that wage rate. For convenience, we assume that
there exist a representative rm that combines householdslabour inputs into a homogenous input










where w is the wage mark-up. Taking wt and w;t as given the aggregators demand for the labour





























In each period, a function 1   w of households receive a random signal and they are allowed
to reset wages optimally wnewt . All other households can only partially index their wages by past
























































































































































































t 1 + (1  w) (wnewt )
1
1 w (45)





































Governments budget constraint adjusted for long-term debt is given by
bSt +









where the left hand side is the total (short plus long-term) debt issued by the government at time







Gt = gtyt (49)
4.6 Monetary policy












where mt = m
m
t 1e
R!R;t . In other words, the policymaker adjusts the nominal interest rate in
response to its lag value, to ination deviations from the target
t   0:999t 1 =  (t 1   0:999t 2) + !;t (51)
(De Graeve et al. (2009)) and to trend output gap deviations from its long-run equilibrium y.
4.7 Market clearing conditions
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~ydt = ~ct +





= rSt   x
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  x Bt   #Bt 1   (1  #) B ~bS;t bL;t2 (70)
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4.9 Steady states





Households e¤ective interest rate spread is given by nancial intermediary rst order condition
rh
rS
= rS = rL








i = k (73)
c = (1  g) y   i (74)
~ =
d (~c   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(85)
mct = w^t + h^t   y^t (86)
mct = w^t + h^t   y^t
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y^t = z^t + h^t + (1  ) k^t (89)
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4.11 Estimation
A number of parameters (Table 1) is decided prior to the estimation of the model. The time discount
factor ( = 0:99), the steady state value of the productivity growth ( = 1) and the ination target
21
( = 1) imply that the steady state value of the interest rate is 4%. We follow the literature
and assume log consumption preferences (C = 1,Justiniano et al. (2010)). Similar to Smets and
Wouters (2007) steady-state price and wage markup are set equal to 20% and 10% respectively. The
share of capital in the production () and its depreciation rate () have been calibrated to 0:36 and
0:025, numbers typically used in the literature (Christiano et al. (2005), Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). B has been set equal to 1 to match the steady state short- to
long-term debt ratio in the data (see De Graeve and Theodoridis (2016)). As in Smets and Wouters
(2007),Leeper et al. (2010), and Traum and Yang (2011) the steady-state government spending to





and the lump-sum tax response coe¢ cient to debt
() equal 0:18, 0:65 and 0:025, respectively.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Mnemonic Description Value
 Time Discount Factor 0.990
 Steady State Productivity Growth 1.000
 Steady State Ination Target 1.000
C Inverse Intertemporal Substitution Elasticity 1.000
y Steady State Price Markup 1.200
w Steady State Wage Markup 1.100
 Tax Response to Debt 0.025
 Production Capital Share 0.360
 Capital Depreciation Rate 0.025
1
B
Steady State Long to Short Term Debt Ratio 1.000
h Steady State Hours 0.333
g Steady State Government Spending to GDP Ratio 0.180
bS
y Steady State Short Term Debt to GDP Ratio 0.650
Table 2 summarises the prior moments and density functions of the structural parameter vector
estimated. The same prior moments are employed for the estimation of both full and limited
information models. These moments are those employed by Smets and Wouters (2007).
Tables 3 and 4 report the posterior moments of the Full and Limited Information models
respectively. Both set of estimates are very similar with each other but also with those in the
literature.
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Table 2: Estimated Parameters: Prior Moments
Mnemonic Description Density Mean STD
L Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity Normal 1.50 0.25
 Liquidity Adjustment Cost Normal 5.00 0.25
b Habit Smoothing Beta 0.75 0.05
y Price Indexation Beta 0.50 0.15
y Calvo Price Reset Probability Beta 0.50 0.10
w Wage Indexation Beta 0.50 0.15
w Calvo Wage Reset Probability Beta 0.50 0.10
R Policy Smoothing Beta 0.75 0.10
 Ination Policy Response Normal 1.50 0.10
y Output Policy Response Normal 0.12 0.05
  Capital Utilisation Cost Normal 5.00 0.50
I Investment Adjustment Cost Normal 4.00 0.50
 AR Persistence Non Stationary Productivity Process Beta 0.50 0.20
bS AR Persistence of Short Term Debt Supply Process Beta 0.50 0.20
y AR Persistence Price Markup Process Beta 0.50 0.20
y STD Price Markup Process Beta 0.50 0.20
W AR Persistence Wage Markup Process Beta 0.50 0.20
W MA Persistence Wage Markup Process Beta 0.50 0.20
 AR Persistence Ination Target Process Beta 0.50 0.20
m AR Persistence Monetary Policy Process Beta 0.50 0.20
g AR Persistence Government Spending Process Beta 0.50 0.20
 AR Persistence Investment Specic Process Beta 0.50 0.20
 STD Non Stationary Productivity Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
bS STD of Short Term Debt Supply Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
y MA Persistence Price Markup Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
W STD Persistence Wage Markup Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
 STD Ination Target Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
rS STD Monetary Policy Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
g STD Government Spending Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
 STD Investment Specic Process Inv-Gamma 0.10 2.00
Notes: STD denotes the standard deviation and Inv-Gamma the inverse gamma distribution.
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Table 3: Full Information Model Estimated Parameters: Posterior Moments
Mnemonic Description Mode 5th 95th
L Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity 1.53 0.83 1.81
 Liquidity Adjustment Cost 4.05 4.12 5.40
b Habit Smoothing 0.71 0.71 0.76
y Price Indexation 0.92 0.78 0.92
y Calvo Price Reset Probability 0.89 0.89 0.92
w Wage Indexation 0.75 0.32 0.84
w Calvo Wage Reset Probability 0.46 0.46 0.91
R Policy Smoothing 0.74 0.76 0.87
 Ination Policy Response 1.90 1.87 2.11
y Output Policy Response 0.14 0.13 0.31
  Capital Utilisation Cost 5.17 4.21 5.84
I Investment Adjustment Cost 5.45 4.63 5.99
 AR Persistence Non Stationary Productivity Process 0.29 0.14 0.39
bS AR Persistence of Short Term Debt Supply Process 0.86 0.33 0.85
y AR Persistence Price Markup Process 0.89 0.84 0.94
y STD Price Markup Process 1.00 0.99 1.00
W AR Persistence Wage Markup Process 0.95 0.71 0.97
W MA Persistence Wage Markup Process 0.83 0.60 0.87
 AR Persistence Ination Target Process 0.17 0.15 0.57
m AR Persistence Monetary Policy Process 0.41 0.12 0.41
g AR Persistence Government Spending Process 0.95 0.95 1.00
 AR Persistence Investment Specic Process 0.96 0.94 0.97
 STD Non Stationary Productivity Process 1.03 0.94 1.13
bS STD of Short Term Debt Supply Process 0.99 1.12 4.00
y MA Persistence Price Markup Process 0.17 0.14 0.18
W STD Persistence Wage Markup Process 1.08 0.90 1.15
 STD Ination Target Process 0.10 0.10 0.12
rS STD Monetary Policy 0.23 0.20 0.24
g STD Government Spending Process 0.59 0.55 0.65
 STD Investment Specic Process 0.31 0.29 0.39
Notes: The columns 5th and 95th refer to the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution of
the structural parameter vector.
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Table 4: Limited Information Model Estimated Parameters: Posterior Moments
Mnemonic Description Mode 5th 95th
L Inverse Labour Supply Elasticity 1.57 1.19 1.99
 Liquidity Adjustment Cost 4.32 3.92 4.76
b Habit Smoothing 0.65 0.62 0.68
y Price Indexation 0.89 0.81 0.92
y Calvo Price Reset Probability 0.70 0.66 0.74
w Wage Indexation 0.79 0.61 0.91
w Calvo Wage Reset Probability 0.29 0.23 0.36
R Policy Smoothing 0.75 0.69 0.80
 Ination Policy Response 1.91 1.88 1.96
y Output Policy Response 0.09 0.05 0.12
  Capital Utilisation Cost 5.34 4.53 6.03
I Investment Adjustment Cost 4.52 3.89 5.28
 AR Persistence Non Stationary Productivity Process 0.22 0.12 0.34
bS AR Persistence of Short Term Debt Supply Process 0.86 0.82 0.88
y AR Persistence Price Markup Process 0.98 0.95 0.99
y STD Price Markup Process 0.64 0.48 0.73
W AR Persistence Wage Markup Process 0.96 0.92 0.99
W MA Persistence Wage Markup Process 0.73 0.59 0.83
 AR Persistence Ination Target Process 0.11 0.04 0.23
m AR Persistence Monetary Policy Process 0.39 0.27 0.54
g AR Persistence Government Spending Process 0.95 0.92 0.97
 AR Persistence Investment Specic Process 0.95 0.92 0.97
 STD Non Stationary Productivity Process 1.02 0.94 1.12
bS STD of Short Term Debt Supply Process 0.92 0.79 1.10
y MA Persistence Price Markup Process 0.16 0.14 0.18
W STD Persistence Wage Markup Process 1.22 1.06 1.36
 STD Ination Target Process 0.10 0.10 0.11
rS STD Monetary Policy 0.24 0.23 0.27
g STD Government Spending Process 0.59 0.54 0.65
 STD Investment Specic Process 0.31 0.28 0.35
Notes: The columns 5th and 95th refer to the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior distribution of
the structural parameter vector.
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